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EITHER WAY YOU GET SAUSAGES: ONE
LEGISLATOR'S VIEW OF THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS
Sheila James Kuehl*
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before I was elected to California's State Assembly, I had
heard, more than once, "There are two things you never want to
watch being made: sausages and law." The origin of the witticism
may be shrouded in historic fog but its meaning is clear. The legisla-
tive process is long, verbal, filled with compromise and subject to
endless, seemingly random, amendment. The movement of a bill
from idea to signature can involve several layers of analysis, testi-
mony, scrutiny, amendment, discussion, reworking and rewriting.
This Article suggests, however, that the legislative process is in-
finitely preferable to the process by which an initiative becomes law,
whereby a group of people decides there ought to be a law, drafts it,
gathers signatures based on an extremely foreshortened and often
misstated summary of the intent, puts it on the ballot and, using ad-
vertising and other marketing techniques, gets it into statutory law,
or, even worse, into the state constitution.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The journey of a piece of legislation is difficult and tortuous. In
late fall or winter, a legislator, advocate, or lobbyist has an idea that a
change is needed in the statutory law or the state constitution. If a
legislator decides that the change is indeed appropriate, he or she
submits the idea, sometimes with proposed amendment language, to
the Legislative Counsel, which then drafts a bill that accomplishes the
desired result in the law. At that point, the bill returns to the author,
* Speaker pro Tempore of the California State Assembly; J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1978; elected to the Harvard Board of Overseers, 1997; Assoc. Prof.
of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 1985-89; Adjunct Prof., UCLA Law
School, various years.
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who then consults with staff, advocates, proponents, agencies and or-
ganizations to see if the bill language is appropriate. If so, the bill is
put "across the desk" in time to meet a late February deadline and
then receives a number-an AB Number for State Assembly bills or
an SB Number for State Senate bills. The bill then goes to the Rules
Committee which will assign it to a policy committee for a hearing
based on the subject matter of the bill. Each policy committee has a
particular subject matter jurisdiction. Often, the Rules Committee
"double-refers" a bill, that is, refers the bill to more than one com-
mittee. The Rules Committee also "keys" the bill to indicate
whether it is fiscal or non-fiscal-fiscal meaning it will cost the state
some money to implement. Because they incur implementation
costs, fiscal bills must surmount an extra hurdle.'
The bill is sent to the first policy committee to be set for hear-
ing.2 At the same time, the author of the bill circulates a "Co-
Author" letter, which asks other members to read the bill and decide
if they want to become co-authors. The policy committee consultant
who deals with the particular subject matter of the bill analyzes the
bill in conjunction with the staff member on the member's staff also
assigned to work on the bill. The analysis explains the bill, points out
flaws, and recommends amendments. Armed with the analysis, the
committee members come to the hearing, listen to pro and con wit-
nesses and ask questions, some of which may be prepared for them
by their own staff. If the bill passes out of the committee, it may then
go to a second policy committee where the process starts all over
again. If not-and if the bill is fiscal-it goes to the Appropriations
Committee where it receives another hearing related to the cost of
the bill. If it passes this committee, it is sent to the Floor, where it is
analyzed again, presented to the members, argued, and possibly
amended to address concerns of opponents and other members. If it
passes off the Floor, it begins the entire process again in the other
house.'
1. In addition to being heard in a policy committee, the bill must also be
heard in the Appropriations Committee before coming to the Floor for a vote.
2. If a bill is "double-referred," it goes to one policy committee and then if it
passes, to the next. The order is set by agreement of the Chairs of the two policy
committees.
3. Assembly members' bills-those that begin with AB-start in the As-
sembly Committees, continue through the Assembly Appropriations Committee,
and are voted on the Assembly Floor. These bills then start over in the Senate.
Senate bills-those that begin with SB-start in a Senate policy committee or
committees, continue through the Senate Appropriations Committee-if fiscal-
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During the time of consideration in the Assembly and Senate,
which lasts from March to August, the bill is poked, prodded, ques-
tioned, discussed, debated and scrutinized. Many bills do not make it
out of committee. More lose out at the Appropriations Committee.
More fail to pass the Floor. More fail in the second house. Those
that escape both houses go to the governor for signature or veto.
Many are vetoed. Constitutional amendments then go on for an ad-
ditional step and are placed on the ballot for a public vote.
III. THE APPEAL OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Compare the rigors of the legislative process4 with the initiative
process, which seems, on its face, to be sorely deficient. Only its pro-
ponents have a hand in drafting the proposed initiative, and as a re-
sult, the proposal does not benefit from a great deal of critical shap-
ing. The debate over the provisions of an initiative is not the least bit
exhaustive, detailed, or "nit-picky." Rather, a limited group of peo-
ple, corporate entities, or organizations propose their version of good
public policy and try to sell it to the voters on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, with the wording set in stone and unamendable.
Still, Californians love their initiatives.5 They do not like reading
the long ones.' They do not like it when the courts strike them down
for their constitutional defects. They do not like finding out later
that they were wrong or misled about the contents But generally,
the people of California jealously guard their ability to make and
shape the law independent of the legislature.9 For the most part, the
people feel excluded from the long and arduous process of legisla-
tion.'" They read about the new laws on January 1 of each year and
and pass off the Senate Floor to start over in the Assembly. If amended in the
second house, the bill returns to the Floor of the house of origin for concurrence.
4. See supra Part II.
5. See A Love-Hate Affair With the Initiative Process: Complaints Aside, the
Public Seems to Want to Keep the System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at B4.
6. See Dan Morain, Open Primary's Impact Big, But Unpredictable, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al.
7. See Ron Prince, Commentary Out of Purgatory, Let 187's Appeals Begin
Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1998, at B7.
8. See Tony Perry, Suit to Overturn bill Net Ban Dismissed, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1994, at A22.
9. See A Love-Hate Affair, supra note 5, at B4.
10. See generally Eric Bailey & Nick Anderson, Democrats Seek New Bilin-
gual Education Plan Reform, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, at A3 (comparing the
public's involvement in a bilingual education initiative with their relative lack of
involvement in failed attempts of the California legislature to pass a bill on the
same subject).
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shake their heads or wonder at the omissions. The initiative process
provides the people with a way to remedy the paralysis and inaction
they perceive in the legislature."
IV. PROBLEM ONE: SOMETIMES INACFION IS ACTUALLY REFUSAL
The journey negotiated by each piece of legislation through the
legislature is a minefield. At any juncture, it can blow up. The audi-
ence is very small-just fifty percent plus one on any committee." A
hostile amendment can cost the deciding vote. In many cases, the
solutions to perceived problems proposed by the bill may not be
considered good public policy by committee members. Given the
kind of careful vetting given to bills, it is more likely that a bill will
die than succeed. 3 Often, legislation does not make it through the
process during the first year of its proposal, but the lessons learned
help to shape the bill in the next legislative cycle. Still, the failure to
produce a bill is seen by the public as a failure to address a problem
in a timely. manner. 4
Bilingual education is a good example. One bill set out a modest
solution to the issues raised by bilingual education and allowed each
school district, within limits, to design a program they thought would
work for their students.' The bill failed to get the requisite votes."
Some members believed it did not go far enough and wanted bilin-
gual education eradicated altogether.' Others thought it opened the
door to simple English immersion classes, which they feared would
just keep mono lingual, non-English speaking students adrift in an in-
comprehensible sea.'" While these forces struggled, the bill was
slowed, then stopped. 9 This should have been perceived as a rational
refusal by the legislature to hurriedly adopt an unworkable solution
to a complicated problem, and as a way of working toward a more
11. See A Love-Hate Affair, supra note 5, at B4 ("The initiative is viewed as a
method for citizens to write their own laws when the Legislature fails to act.").
12. A simple majority of the members of any committee.
13. See generally California Preview: It's Time to See How Bills Measured
Up, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1997, at D2 ("about 40% of the more than 3,000 bills
introduced at the start of the 1997-98 Session failed to clear the house in which
they were first submitted").
14. See Bailey & Anderson, supra note 10, at A3.
15. See id.
16. See U
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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intelligent approach during the next legislative session. Instead, it
was perceived as a failure."
Into the void stepped an initiative, which chose one solution-a
solution, which, in my opinion, had already been declared unconsti-
tutional. Yet it looked at first blush to be a popular approach.
V. PROBLEM TWO: DRAFTING
One of the most frequently heard complaints made by voters
about initiatives is that they are too complicated."1 This complaint is
rendered even more serious by the fact that the voters do not read
the actual language of the initiative but only the summaries prepared
for the voter pamphlet.2 The language of the amendments made to
current law in the initiative may be circular, inappropriately placed in
the statutory framework, awkward, vague, unclear, imprecise, and, in
some cases, may not even accomplish the simple end sought by the
proponents.' Yet, the initiative language does not undergo any real
scrutiny.24
One solution may be to require that the proposed language of an
initiative be submitted for vetting by some concomitant of the Legis-
lative Counsel's office. This body would have a precise mandate to
check for placement in the state codes, precision of language, and
analysis of the effect of the language in comparison to the stated de-
sired effect. This would provide a guideline for authors to check the
effects of the proposed initiatives.
For example, imagine an initiative that would require California
to give full faith and credit to any domestic violence restraining order
issued by another state, territory, or tribal court. The proposed draft
may be deficient in that there may be several sections of either the
Family Code or the Code of Civil Procedure that would need to be
20. See id.
21. See A Love-Hate Affair, supra note 5, at B4.
22. See generally Frank del Olmo, Perspective on Prop. 227: Take High Road
in Bilingual Debate, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1998, at M5 (discussing the misleading
nature of initiative summaries).
23. See, e.g., Sandy Sohcot, Between the Lines of the Civil Rights Initiative,
S.F. Bus. TIMEs, May 24, 1996, at 39 (noting that the hidden purpose of Proposi-
tion 209 Clause c would not be understood by voters to accomplish the stated
objectives of the initiative).
24. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 501, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 287 (1991) (declaring it is the court's "solemn duty to jealously guard
the precious initiative power"); Amador Valley Joint Union Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,
241 (1978) (stressing the limited nature of the judicial inquiry).
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amended while the draft addresses only two. Or, the proposed draft
may require more deference to the other state than the Constitution
allows or may fail to comport with a federal statute. A pre-initiative
review by the Legislative Counsel's office would bring to light such
deficiencies early in the process, give proponents the opportunity to
correct such deficiencies early in the process, and give proponents the
opportunity to structure the initiative's language to achieve their
goals without violating the state or federal constitutions.
Another solution would be to require only that the language be
tested in court against the California and Federal Constitutions. This
process would be akin to an advisory opinion rendered by the court
or could simply be in the form of an opinion by the Attorney Gen-
eral's office.2 Again, the opinion rendered would be communicated
to the authors for their consideration. While the authors would not
be required to make any of the recommended changes, the opinion
might be made available to the public which, in turn, would allow op-
ponents to consider the arguments for their own purposes.
VI. PROBLEM THREE: SHORT ON INFORMATION, LONG ON
IMAGINATION
One of the most unfortunate aspects of the public's relationship
with an initiative is how little specific information they are given
about the actual provisions of the initiative and how much they
imagine in that regard.2' Since most of the initiatives are sold to the
public through the use of sound bites and billboards,2 the voters feel
25. The State of Florida has used the advisory opinion process as a pre-
election review of initiatives. The advisory opinion is not binding on a later,
post-election review, but it is "extremely persuasive" in a later challenge. See
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE, DEMOCRACY BY INI-
TIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA's FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 108-09
(1992).
26. Proponents of 209, for example, labeled the California Civil Rights Initia-
tive as an amendment which guaranteed "equality of opportunity" and elimi-
nated the "entitlements... that underlie the current racial and ethnic spoils sys-
tem." Glynn Custred & Tom Wood, Racial Gender Preferences Hurt Everybody,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1995, at A21. Although citizens, are, presumably, "fair-
minded people who truly want equal opportunity ... and diversity," opponents
argued that Proposition 209 has potentially far-reaching, negative consequences
beyond what supporters said to the press. Sohcot, supra note 23, at 39; see also
Julia A. Guizan, Comment, Is the California Civil Rights Initiative a Wolf in
Sheep's Clothing?: Distinguishing Constitutional Amendment From Revision in
California's Initiative Process, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 261,289 & n.199 (1997).
27. See, e.g., Dave Lesher, Initiative's Backers, GOP Both Intensify Ad Cam-
paigns, L.A. TIvES, Nov. 1, 1996, at A3 (noting the onslaught of money being
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unjustifiably confident and well acquainted with a few aspects of the
initiative which they believe to represent the whole. Most voters who
voted in favor of term limits.' for instance, understood that they were
voting against career politicians but were not aware that they were
also denying legislators the ability to participate in any kind of re-
tirement fund.29 Public sentiment, even predating the term limit ini-
tiative, supported the proposition that legislators should not be al-
lowed simply to serve a few years and then go off into the sunset with
a hefty, lifetime pension.3 The term limit initiative, however, did not
even allow legislators to participate in the general state retirement
system to the extent of their service, dollar for dollar.3
Similarly, voters who supported the "three strikes"'32 initiative
continue to express concern that the third strike is not required to be
a violent or even serious felony.3 Most believed they were voting to
get hard-core career criminals off the streets.3
Further, voters who supported Proposition 2093' believed they
were voting against preferences on the basis of race and gender in
employment and education.36 After the election, they were surprised
to learn that they had also voted to lower the standard by which the
state is judged when it discriminates against someone on the basis of
spent to promote different views of Proposition 209 prior to the 1996 vote).
28. See Proposition 140, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 137-38 (Nov. 6, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET] (amending several sections of California Constitution).
29. See Paul Jacobs, Initiative Cuts More Than Term of Office, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1990, at A3.
30. See id. (noting that every legislator could earn a substantial monthly pen-
sion).
31. See Proposition 140 § 4, in 1990 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 28, at 137 (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 4.5).
32. See Proposition 184, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 64-65 (Nov. 8, 1994) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West
Supp. 1998)).
33. See California Tomorrow: By Promoting Mass Transportation, Banning
Smoking in Public and Increasing Prison Terms For Career Criminals, California
Ballot Propositions Reflect Growing Statewide Concerns About Transportation,
Public Health, and Crimes, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1994, at 12Z1.
34. See id.
35. See Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECrION 94 (Nov. 5, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET]
(enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31).
36. Proposition 209 was officially titled "Prohibition Against Discrimination
or Preferential Treatment by State and Other Public Entities. Initiative Consti-
tutional Amendment." See id. at 30. See 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 35, at 30.
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their gender.' If, for example, a man had been given a job instead of
a woman on the basis that the state thought men were simply better
at that kind of work, prior to Prop. 209 the state was required to show
a compelling reason, which is a very stringent standard.38 After Prop.
209, the state's action just needs to be reasonable.39
I have spoken to voters who supported the proposed anti-
bilingual education initiative,' but did not believe that it simply re-
quires students to be immersed in classes taught in English. They
imagined a panoply of services that will help monolingual students
ease their way into a more rapidly assimilated English proficiency,41
including instruction in the English language. This desirable set of
programs is not in the initiative.42 These voters will be disappointed
when they later discover the disparity between what they believed
they were supporting and the actual language of the initiative.
Many who supported Proposition 20843 thought that they were
supporting campaign reform that gave less, not more, power to spe-
cial interest groups.44 They were wrong. Proposition 208 provided
incentives to political candidates who voluntarily adopted campaign
spending limits:45 State Assembly candidates could not spend more
than $200,000 in the general election, and State Senate hopefuls
would be limited to $400,000.46 Because State Senators represent
37. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, Sex Discrimination
Made Legal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at B9.
38. See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16-17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329,339 (1971).
39. See Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 37, at B9.
40. The initiative has been numbered Proposition 227 by California Secretary
of State Bill Jones. See 9 State Propositions for June Ballot Get Numbers, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at A19.
41. See Nick Anderson, Debate Rises as Prop. 227 Vote Nears, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1998, at A3 (noting voter support for giving children more English edu-
cation while preserving the bilingual safety net).
42. See id. (explaining that the "English for the Children" initiative only in-
cludes a year of lessons for the least proficient children before requiring the chil-
dren to be immersed in regular classes).
43. Supporters of Proposition 208 included Californians for Political Reform,
a committee sponsored by the League of Women Voters of California, the
American Association of Retired Persons-California (AARP), Common Cause,
and United We Stand America. See Proposition Debate (visited Mar. 30, 1998)
<http:llwww.vidya.comlcaprops/208/linfo.html>.
44. See Proposition Debate (Debate on Proposition 208) (visited Mar. 30,
1998) <http:llwww.vidya.comlHyperNews/getlprops/208.html>.
45. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 10, A-6 (West).
46. See id.
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approximately 800,000 people47 and State Assembly members repre-
sent about 395,000,' this amounts to a little less than fifty cents per
potential constituent. Our ability to inform the electorate about who
we are and what we favor was vastly limited by the initiative. No
such limitation was placed on the special interests, however. Propo-
sition 208 merely prohibited special interests from conferring with
legislators before publishing literature about us,4 9 which means that
your understanding of my positions would not have been seen or
shaped by me.
VII. PROBLEM FOUR: THE MEDDLESOME COURT
A court is required to decide questions properly before it? Very
much like legislators who have a green "yes" button and a red "no"
button on their desks on the Floor, but no "beats the heck out of me"
button, the court must render an opinion. This unfortunate task of
having to judge the constitutionality of initiatives1 -most of which
are deficient for all the reasons set forth above-leads to yet another
problem: the dissatisfaction of the voters with the third and "least
dangerous" branch of government.52 The voters perceive the court's
thoughtful analyses as "judicial activism" 3 while misperceiving the
47. The State Senate consists of 40 senators, representing a total population
of 31,589,153. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) and THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACrS 1997 at 657 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1996) (population figure
from 1995).
48. The State Assembly consists of 80 members. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §
2(a), representing the same population as the State Senate.
49. See Campaign Funding Limits Go On Trial, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at
A3.
50. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)'137, 169 (1803); Kopp v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 11 Cal. 4th 607, 673, 905 P.2d 1248, 1292, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 108, 151 (1995).
51. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1982).
52. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 675, 771 P.2d 814, 835, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 886 (1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring) ("The legitimacy, prestige and
effectiveness of the judiciary-the 'least dangerous branch'-ultimately depend
on public confidence in our unwavering commitment to [the principled declara-
tion of public norms].").
53. See Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 673-74, 905 P.2d at 1292, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152
(Mosk, J., concurring). In upholding the validity of Proposition 73, Justice Mosk
noted the traditional limits of the court:
[I]f.. .this court had general authority to rewrite a statute-as the
dissenters evidently believe in their remarkable.. .display of judicial
activism-so too would [all other state courts] .... The enactment of
a statute would not be the end of the legislative process .... Rather,
we have consistently maintained the obvious and significant
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requirement placed on the court to balance the interests of those
voting in the majority and the constitutional protections accorded a
minority or a process.
Every time the court finds a constitutional flaw in an initiative,
those who voted for it complain that the court has thwarted the "will
of the People."" The complaint would be well taken but for two
things. First, the court is required to thwart the will of the people,
the will of the legislature, the will of Congress, the will of city coun-
cils, and even the will of mosquito abatement boards,55 if that will
runs afoul of the protections found in the state and federal constitu-
tions." Second, the court must consider the actual language of the
initiative and not simply the sound bites with which it was sold to the
voters.
VIII. CAN THE INITIATIVE PROCESS BE SAVED?
Not only can the initiative process be saved, it must be saved.
The initiative process is thriving and the ballot is crowded with ideas.
The question might better be asked, "can the populace be saved from
the initiative process?" Ideas abound for revisions and I suggest an
incremental approach. Let us begin by trying to help proposed lan-
guage be as constitutional as possible and by eliciting the help of a
neutral, yet knowledgeable, body in the drafting. In addition, per-
haps debates could be presented, in the same way as candidate de-
bates are presented, only more in the mold of a committee hearing,
with witnesses pro and con, questions by people pro and con that
probe each section, nothing left in the shadow.
After all, perhaps we would like to know what is in our sausage,
if only to make some intelligent choices.
distinction between interpreting a measure and making changes in its
words.
Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
54. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Assoc. v. Fresno Metro. Projects Auth., 40
Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1362,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269,271 (1995).
55. See Los Angeles Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51
Cal. 2d 331, 333 P.2d 1 (1958).
56. See Howard Jarvis, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 1362,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271.
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